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Abstract
Ownership and control are often concurring attributes in the ordinary situation 
of property ownership. In the context of publicly held companies, a 
phenomenon occurs whereby the persons who own the company are precluded 
from controlling it. The reason for this is that as the number of shareholders 
rises, control is delegated to managers, and shareholders are limited to 
ineffective control via shareholder general meetings. This article posits that the 
separation between ownership and control is growing in Ethiopia, and submits 
some empirical evidence in support of this claim. Relying on the data and 
literature on corporate governance, the article attempts to show the deficiency 
of the Commercial Code in protecting the rights of minority shareholders in the 
context of such publicly held companies.
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Introduction
The share company is one of the forms of business organizations recognized 
under the Ethiopian Commercial Code. It is established through the issuance of 
shares to an unlimited number of members as provided for by Articles 304-509 
of the Commercial Code. The result of public subscription toward the formation 
of a share company is often accumulation of huge capital from thousands of 
shareholders.
Publicly held share companies give rise to a host of complex corporate 
governance issues. On the one hand, they necessitate the transfer of 
management of the company from the numerous shareholders into the hands of 
a few managers. And, such a mechanism inherently carries with it the risk of 
unfair advantage or exploitation by the managers against dispersed shareholders. 
On the other hand, should any one or more persons own a chunk of the 
corporate capital, control of the company will largely fall into their hands, and 
small holders face the same or even greater risk of exploitation.
The Commercial Code of Ethiopia has basic rules on the governance of 
such companies. However, these rules are not adequate to safeguard minority 
shareholders from undue exploitation. This article attempts to deal with what the 
potential problems can be and what type of legal change, if any, needs to be 
made to address the newly evolving corporate governance issues in Ethiopia in 
the context of publicly held companies for safeguarding minority rights. The 
article does not promise or claim to provide the panacea for all corporate 
governance problems in the country. Nor does it attempt to unveil the “vast 
corporate governance malpractices” that are assumed to exist in the country. At 
the current state of corporate disclosure this is almost impossible.1
1 The writer had to visit the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) several times to get some 
statistical data on private banks. Unfortunately, his request was denied by the Bank’s 
Legal Directorate, even if he had a letter of support which showed research objectives. 
The Banking Business Proclamation 592/2008 apparently says nothing on disclosure 
by the bank to the public. Quite inexplicably, such documents which should be with 
the Ministry of Trade and industry (as per the requirement of the law) do not exist 
there in case of banks and insurance companies. However, Proclamation 592/2008, 
under Article 10 (5) requires all banks to make available at their head offices free of 
charge, to any interested person their share registers that show the names and voting 
rights of their shareholders. The writer’s repeated attempt did not bear fruit in getting 
the required information from the banks either, except from one. Understandably, 
banks are more reluctant to disclose their documents. The realistic solution would be 
to give this service at the NBE or MoTI level. If it is so difficult to get shareholder 
data for academic purposes, it would be much more so for the investing public that
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The article is limited to analyzing the trend of corporate ownership 
dispersion, and the resulting divorce between ownership and control - a trend 
which renders every shareholder a minority. it also suggests solutions. The 
article starts with an overview of the notion, models and issues of corporate 
governance with the aim of laying down the conceptual bases for the subsequent 
discussion. The second section addresses the evolution of the ownership pattern 
in Ethiopia. The third and fourth sections deal with the underlying legal and 
institutional causes and effects of the different corporate governance paradigms. 
The conclusion underlines the implications of the themes addressed. in this 
article the terms “managers” and “board of directors” are used interchangeably.
1. An Overview on Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Since the usage of the term “corporate governance” by Robert Tricker in his 
book titled “International Corporate Governance,”2 published in 1984, the term 
has gained prominence in company law and literature. The issues addressed 
under the “corporate governance” label are, however, nearly as old as company 
law itself, although the notion has not been static in terms of content. Corporate 
governance is one of those fluid concepts in corporate law and finance which 
scholars rarely attempt to define. The range of issues that fall under “corporate 
governance” are tightly intertwined with those of corporate finance.3 For 
instance, as per one definition, corporate governance “deals with the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return 
on their investment.”4 Such a definition seems to be too narrow to accommodate 
all the issues that arise in relation to modern day corporate governance, and 
reveals the complexities involved in the concept.
indeed, modern corporate governance may also involve corporate social 
responsibility with a view to addressing the interests of employees, local 
communities and the public at large, and not merely the interest of suppliers of 
capital. It is thus not surprising to sometimes see a misconceived usage of the 
term. For example, Article 14 (4) (c) of the Banking Business Proclamation 
592/2008 which states “The National Bank may issue directives on the duties, 
responsibilities and good corporate governance of the boards of directors” 
seems to distort the idea of corporate governance. Corporate governance is not
looks for a target company’s net worth. Corporate disclosure, a central facet of 
corporate governance, is at a rudimentary stage in Ethiopia.
2 Cited in Anne Carver (1997), “ Corporate Governance: Capitalism’s Fellow 
Traveler?”, in Fiona M. Patfield, (ed.) Perspectives on Company Law:2, (London: 
Kluwer Law Int.), p. 71
3 Corporate law and Corporate Governance: The Hungarian Experience,
< http://www.econ.core.hu/doc/dp/dp/mtdp0411.pdf > p.4
4 Ibid.
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just a single strand in the managerial duties of the board of directors.’ Quite to 
the contrary, the notion of ‘corporate governance’ refers to the overall legal, 
institutional and regulatory framework in which the interests of stakeholders 
surrounding companies are coordinated and protected. Note that the concept is 
much wider than corporate management. The latter notion occupies a pivotal 
place in the discourse of corporate governance, but does not replace it. Broad as 
it is, corporate governance is generally shaped by not only company law, but 
also other areas of laws and customs such as auditing and accounting practices, 
contract law, bankruptcy law, securities law, tax law, and so on.
The role that corporate business plays in modern economies has brought 
companies to the spotlight. Thus, corporate governance nowadays refers to all 
the issues in relation to ownership and control of corporate property, 
shareholders’ rights and treatment, powers and responsibilities of the board of 
directors, disclosure and transparency of corporate information, the protections 
of the interests of stakeholders in addition to that of shareholders, enforcement 
of rights, etc.5 What lies at the heart of all these issues is the question of 
ownership and control of the company which is inextricably correlated with 
ownership of its shares.
The macro level causes and effects of demutualization of ownership and 
control permeate the corporate governance debate.6 Meanwhile, the rights, 
responsibilities and roles of owners of property in the form of shares and its 
managers remain to be an enduring problem. with the emergence of companies 
with several thousands of shareholders (each possibly holding less than a 
fraction of one percent of the capital), complete separation occurs between 
ownership (vested in the shareholders) and control, which lies in the hands of 
few individuals who manage the company.7 Within this context, a host of 
governance issues inevitably arise some of which are summarized below.
Corporate governance problems begin from the danger to shareholders’ 
most traditional right to dividend and extend to such complex issues as 
protection of corporate assets from misuse by managers, minority rights to 
representation in the board, challenging the decision of the board in a court of 
law, suing the board or third parties on behalf of the company, and leaving the 
company upon free will, etc.8 Moreover, there is an important subject of the
5 Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Shortcomings, Challenges and Impact 
on Credit <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Cooper_S_rev.pdf > p. 3.
6 See Generally, Raphael La-Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and 
Robert W. Vishny (1998),” Law and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy, 106# 6.,
7 See generally Adolf Berle and Gardner Means (1933), The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property (New York: The Macmillan Company).
8 All these issues are elaborated in detail in, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
(2004).
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corporate governance controversy which relates to the powers and 
responsibilities of the board. This raises crucial issues such as: what powers 
does the board have? who is it accountable to? How is it organized? what are 
its standards of liability? Another pertinent issue relates to the disclosure of 
information to the shareholders and the public by the company for which the 
management is responsible. what, when, and how to disclose corporate 
information are very relevant questions in modern corporate climate.
Moreover, the role of stakeholders, which, needless to say, is a far more 
complex issue, seems to be the latest addition to the stock of themes addressed 
within the gamut of corporate governance. it has in fact, to some extent, 
reshaped the very conception of a company. Thus issues such as what are the 
legitimate ends of corporate business? what, if any, are the social 
responsibilities of the company, etc. are addressed within this context. And 
finally, traversing all these issues is the question of enforcement of rights. 
indeed, this is where corporate governance and the issue of good governance 
(raised at the political landscape) converge. Effective enforcement of rights of 
various stakeholders is indeed indispensable, in addition to and apart from the 
literal articulation of laws.
These issues can be broadly divided into two classes. (1) The intra­
company issues (issues of ownership and control); and (2) the relationship 
between the company and outer stakeholders such as employees, creditors, local 
communities and the general public. Although the theme of this article falls 
within the former, the discussion that will follow addresses the problem from 
the perspective of minority rights protection.
1.1- Modalities of Corporate Control
Minority rights discourse is generally part of corporate ownership and control 
discourse. Hence, a few preliminary points about corporate control need to be 
said. The concept of corporate ownership in the present context refers to 
ownership of the shares in a company. Despite some controversy as to who 
owns a company9, the article assumes that for all practical purposes, the 
company is the collective property of its shareholders. Thus, there is no need to 
discuss the notion of corporate ownership here.
In the corporate climate, control can be organized in various ways. In its 
most natural form control can be exercised through complete ownership of the
< http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf >
9 Charles De Hoghton (1970), The Company: Law, Structure and Reform in Eleven 
Countries (London, George Allen and Unvin Ltd.), p,33; John Kay and Aubrey 
Silberston (1997), “Corporate Governance”, in Fiona M. Patfield (eds.) Perspectives 
on Company Law: No. 2 (London: Kluwer Law Int.), pp. 52 - 54.
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company. Such is usually the case under Ethiopian law, for example, when five 
persons form a share company and run it either by themselves or by their hired 
managers whom they can freely remove.10 The second form of creation of 
control is by majority ownership. As the size of companies and shareholders 
grows, complete ownership gives way to part ownership. The ownership of a 
majority of the shares by an individual or small group of individuals gives to the 
individual or the group virtually all the powers of control, in particular the 
power to select and remove the board of directors.11
Corporate control can also be created by legal devices with neither 
complete nor majority ownership. Such legal arrangements include pyramiding 
and the use of non-voting shares. Non-voting shares preclude certain group(s) of 
shareholders from taking part in corporate decision making in exchange for 
some benefit. Article 399(2) of the Commercial Code envisages this possibility. 
But the proportion of such non-voting shares cannot exceed half of the share 
capital under Ethiopian law.12 Pyramiding involves “the owning of a majority 
of the stock of one corporation which in turn holds a majority of the stock of 
another-a process which can be repeated a number of times.”13 With the setting 
up of two or more intermediate companies each of which is controlled by 
majority ownership of its stock by the company higher in the series, “complete 
legal control of a large operating company can be maintained by an ownership 
interest equal to a fraction of one percent of the property controlled.”14
The other, perhaps the last scheme in the evolution of corporate control in 
modern capitalism is what is known as management control which results from 
dispersion of share ownership, save the possibility of existence of a block-holder 
under certain circumstances. when the largest single shareholding amounts to a 
fraction of one percent of the capital, no shareholder is “in a position through his 
holding alone to place important pressure upon the management or to use his 
holding as a considerable nucleus for the accumulation of the majority of votes 
necessary to control.” 15 Thus, control over the company remains in the hands of 
the management.
1.2- Share Ownership Pattern and Governance Models
Corporate governance styles differ across different legal systems. No two 
countries can be similar in absolutely every respect, and thus countries have
10 Commercial Code of Ethiopia Article 307(1) cum Article 317.
11 Berle & Means, supra n. 7, p.71, See also Article 350(1) & (2) cum Article 419 (2) & 
421(3), and Article 365 of the Commercial Code of Ethiopia,1960.
12 Id , Article 36(3) &(4).
13 Berle & Means, supra n. 7, p. 72.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
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diversity. Therefore, corporate governance scholars categorize legal systems 
along lines of broadly shared systems and institutions. On the basis of patterns 
of ownership and control, the corporate governance literature typically 
distinguishes two major corporate governance models: one based on equity 
finance and control primarily by capital markets with a characteristic feature of 
diffuse ownership; and the other based on debt finance and control by banks in 
the dual role of shareholders and major creditors” with a characteristic 
concentration of ownership.16 Equity (share) financing and control by capital 
markets characterize the Anglo-American corporate governance paradigm, and 
debt financing and control by banks is typically associated with the corporate 
governance style of Germany and Japan.17
1.2.1- The Dispersed Ownership Model
For the most part of the 20th century and henceforth, the US, UK and most of the 
English speaking world have consistently maintained dispersion of ownership 
and its concomitant consequence of separation of control and ownership.18 
Dispersed ownership model of corporate governance is characterized by “strong 
securities markets, rigorous disclosure standards, and high market transparency, 
in which the market for corporate control constitutes the ultimate disciplinary 
mechanism” on management.19 Therefore, publicly held companies in the US 
and UK have a higher rate of dispersion of ownership compared to their Civil 
Law counterparts.20
Diffuse ownership emerges in many ways. While some companies may 
undergo different stages of development before they are held by the broader 
public, many publicly held companies are outrightly established by a public 
offering of shares.21 In some other cases smaller family held companies may go 
public by offering their shares to the public.22 Such a change is often motivated
16 Katharina Pistor (2000), Patterns of Legal Charge: Shareholder and Creditor Rights 
in Transition Economies (European Bank Working Paper No.49), p. 21.
17 Ibid.
18 See Generally, Brian R. Cheffins (2002), “Corporate law and Ownership Structure: A 
Darwinian Link?, University of New South Wales Law Journal, 25 #2; See also, The 
Berle-Means Corporation in the 21st Century.
<http://www. law. upenn.edu/currently/seminars/businesslawscholarship/papers/Gord 
on.pdf >
19 John D. Coffee (2001), “The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of law and State 
in the Separation of Ownership and Control,” The Yale Law Journal, 111 # 1, p.3.
20 Id., p. 56.
21 See the Commercial Code of Ethiopia, Articles 317-322; See also Tom Hadden, 
(1977) Company Law and Capitalism, 2nd ed. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson), 
p. 298.
22 Coffee, supra n. 19, p. 25.
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by the need for a huge capital for business expansion. Still in other cases, state 
enterprises may be transformed into publicly held companies by adopting 
privatization through offering shares to the public.23
Anglo-American companies exhibit the largest number of companies with 
diffuse ownership. An empirical study conducted by La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (hereinafter referred to as LLSV) compared stock 
ownership patterns in countries that follow the Anglo American model, the 
Scandinavian Model, the German Civil Law model, and the French Civil Law 
model (the latter three are commonly referred to as Civil Law models). The 
study found that followers of the Anglo-American model exhibit the lowest 
level of concentration of ownership, or the highest level of dispersion.24 For 
example, a comparison of the combined average stake of the three largest 
shareholders in the top ten publicly held companies yielded only 20% in the 
USA. French Civil Law system scored the highest average concentration of 
ownership of 54%, while the average combined block of three largest 
shareholders in the German Civil Law family was 34% and that of the 
Scandinavian was 37%.25 The USA of course seems to have experienced 
dispersion of corporate ownership much earlier. As of 1929, the combined block 
of shares of the twenty largest shareholders in each of the biggest companies- 
Pennsylvania Railroad, Pennsylvania Telecom Company, and Pennsylvania 
Steel Company- were respectively 2.7, 4.0 and 5.1 percent.26
High level of dispersed ownership means absence of owners of big blocks 
of shares (block holders). in a company with numerous shareholders, the 
absence of such block holders gives rise to the surrender by shareholders of 
control to managers.27 The lack of control by shareholders is generally attributed 
to lack of collective action or problems in coordination. Shareholders in a 
publicly held corporation typically have limited legal right to engage in its day 
to day management.28 * Each of the dispersed small holders will thus have little
23 Unfortunately in Ethiopia, Privatization of Public Enterprises Proclamation 146/1998 
fails to state this mode of privatization; See Article 5(2) cum Article 7.
24 La Porta et al, supra n. 6, p. 1146.
25 Ibid, p. 1147.
26 Berle & Means, supra n. 7, p.47.
27 id., p. 6. Even in the 19th century, Karl Marx had asserted that “stock companies in 
general... have an increasing tendency to separate [the] work of management as a 
function from the ownership of capital, be it self owned or borrowed” , see Karl 
Marx, Capital (Republished, 1973), Vol.III, (New York: International Publishers), 
pp. 387-388.
28 Stephen G. Markes (1999k “The Separation of Ownership and Control”, in 
Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics, 3, p. 629.
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information and much less motivation to monitor the management. Though 
dispersed small holders can become powerful by coming together, the cost of 
making such coordinated action is often high. Even voting in which 
shareholders are expected to be more organized has often been manipulated by 
the managers to the latter’s advantage.29
The managers may thus be lured to using their control over corporate assets 
to promote their own interests at the expense of that of the shareholders. To the 
extent that the management pursues its own interests at the expense of the 
shareholders, it imposes what economists call “agency cost.”30 Concern over 
agency cost in widely held public companies was expressed even much earlier. 
Adam Smith, in the Wealth of Nations, 1776 had said:
The directors of such companies [. . .], being the managers rather of other 
peoples’ money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a 
private co-partnery watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they 
are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honor, and 
very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less in the management of the 
affairs of such a company.31
While agency cost can never be completely avoided, the Anglo-American style 
of corporate governance has its inbuilt system of reducing it. There are three 
mechanisms of minimizing agency cost. First, the labour market for corporate 
executives has a disciplinary role on the conduct of managers. Managers want to 
perform well in order to impress potential employers at a better term.32 
Secondly, bad management which sufficiently causes a decline in the market 
share for products or services can cost management its job.33 The most effective 
disciplinary tool in the widely held company however is the third mechanism- 
hostile takeover. Hostile takeover occurs when shareholders unhappy with the 
performance of their company opt to walk out by selling their shares to a control 
bidder. if managers perform persistently badly, an outsider may take over by 
buying a majority of the shares through a hostile takeover i.e., one rejected by 
managers but accepted by shareholders.34
30 Supra n. 28, P. 695; See also, Enya He and David A. Sommer, Separation of 
Ownership and Control: Implications for Board Composition, 
<http://www.aria.org/meetings/2006papers/He_Sommer_ARIA_2006.pdf > p. 6
31 Adam Smith (1776), The Wealth of Nations, Book 5, Chapter 1, Part 3, Art. 1.
32 Cheffins, supra n. 18, p. 17.
33 Ibid.
34 Carver, supra n. 2, p. 86.
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The risk of losing one’s job following a takeover can thus serve as one of 
the means that can discipline management. Other means of reducing agency cost 
include specifying managerial duties legislatively, administratively, or 
contractually and putting in place effective enforcement mechanisms. in this 
respect, enforcement mechanisms by public regulatory organs, private self­
regulation (such as stock exchanges) and individual rights of action (in 
derivative and/or class action) are very instrumental.35
The Anglo-American model has other virtues as compared with systems 
characterized by concentrated ownership. To begin with, the separation of 
ownership and control often carries with it the benefit of hiring more qualified 
managers since executives are hired on the basis of their managerial credentials, 
than on their ability to finance the firm or their family connections with 
dominant shareholders.36 The absence of block holders also creates a convenient 
working environment for professional managers since small dispersed owners 
are ubable to interfere with the business of the management. Thus, the agency 
cost problem may to some extent be offset by this benefit.
From the capital markets perspective, dispersed ownership brings high 
liquidity to stock markets and cheapens the cost of capital37 provided there is a 
stock market in place. Clearly, dispersion of ownership and stock market 
liquidity tend to mutually reinforce each other. More dispersion results in more 
liquidity as there will be more market participants. On the other hand, the more 
liquid the stock market, the easier it becomes for shareholders to liquidate their 
holdings thereby making exit easier for unhappy shareholders. Shareholder 
exodus also plays the role of monitoring management to some extent, since such 
act of shareholders reflects on the state of the company, and eventually leads its 
stock prices to fall. The existence of a liquid market encourages investors to 
easily buy or sell securities. Dispersed ownership of stocks has also the 
economic benefit of distribution of risk, in comparison to the concentrated 
ownership model where few block holders bear all or most of the risks of 
businesses.38
35 George Bittlingmayer (1999), “The Market for Corporate Control (Including 
Takeovers)”, in Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (Eds.), Encyclopedia of 
Law and Economics, 3, p. 703.
36 Cheffins, supra n 18, p. 4.
37 Terry O’Neill (1997), “The Patriarchal Meaning of Contract: Feminist Reflections on 
the Corporate Governance Debate”, in Fiona M. Patfield (Ed.), Perspectives on 
Company Law:2, (London: Kluwer Law Int.), p. 36.
38 This seems to be the explanation behind the current Ethiopian Banking Business 
Proclamation No. 592/2008 which under Article 11(1) limits maximum holding of a 
shareholder to 5% in the following words:
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1.2.2- Concentrated Ownership Model
The concentrated ownership model is essentially characterized by the existence 
of controlling block holders in the company. Often, countries with this paradigm 
of corporate governance tend to have weak securities markets, and low 
disclosure and market transparency standards. As opposed to the case in diffuse 
ownership governance systems, only a modest role is played by the market for 
corporate control, a greater part of the monitoring role being played by large 
banks.39 According to the data compiled by LLSV, most of Civil Law legal 
systems exhibit this system of corporate governance with varying degrees. The 
two systems that form a good representative model in contrast with the 
dispersed ownership style are Germany and Japan. In Germany for instance, as 
of 1997, “eighty-nine percent of all listed companies have a single shareholder 
controlling more than twenty percent of their equity.”40 While this may not 
necessarily mean that there are no small holders in Germany and Japan that have 
tiny fractions of corporate capital, it is obvious that where there are a few block 
holders, the latter exercise greater corporate power thereby suppressing the 
small holders.
An immediate effect of the concentrated ownership model on stock market 
development seems to be negative. The reason is that large block holders that 
wield corporate power may not easily liquidate their holding or more technically 
do not change their market positions, negatively affecting liquidity. Secondly, 
the few small holders cannot create enough liquidity as the volume of stocks on 
the market will be lower. on the other end of the spectrum, small investors will 
not be ready to buy shares for fear of domination by block holders. A study 
comparing Continental stock market practice with that of the Anglo-Saxon 
concludes that, in Continental models, such as the German and Japanese 
systems, “stock market liquidity is not an issue . . . Accounting information is 
often murky. There is only limited protection against insider trading. As a result 
stock markets play a lesser role than the Anglo-American model.”41
The threats that dominant shareholders pose on minorities are too complex 
and can hardly be explained in this article. Arranging for purchase of additional 
shares on favorable terms which is not available otherwise, is just one of many
39
40
41
“No person, other than the Federal Government of Ethiopia, may hold more than 
five percent of a bank’s total shares either on his own or jointly with his spouse or 
with a person who is below the age of 18 related to him by consanguinity to the 
first degree.”
Coffee, supra n. 19, p. 3.
Ibid, p. 23.
Carver, supra n. 2, p. 86.
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examples.42 In other cases, block-holders may transfer corporate assets by 
orchestrated transaction with related companies that skim profits from a publicly 
quoted firm in favor of privately owned ones.43 It is also possible for block 
holders to extract benefits “via high pay and bonuses for employed family 
members and associates, inappropriate related party transactions, systematic bias 
in business decisions and changes in the capital structure, through special 
issuance of shares favoring the controller.”44 In a study, on shareholder and 
creditor rights in transition economies, Katharina Pistor concludes that “firms 
with highly concentrated ownership typically have a shareholder whose stake is 
large enough to effectively control management. The strong position of a block 
holder may, however, endanger the position of minority shareholders”45
Even when no fraud is involved, the interests of block holders seem to be 
susceptible to conflict with minority interests. Block holders (being big 
investors) often prefer a strategy of long term return on their investment, which 
may easily come in square conflict with minority shareholders, who seek 
immediate return. One solution for this problem is to make distribution of 
dividends compulsory for years ending in net profits. Indeed, countries that 
adopted their laws from France have rules that require companies to pay out a 
certain fraction of their declared earnings as dividends.46 In Ethiopia too, Article 
456 (1&2) of the Commercial Code compels the distribution of net profit to 
shareholders as dividend after deduction of legal reserve.
The foregoing analysis should not be taken as an unqualified rejection of 
concentrated ownership and of block-holder governance. Concentrated 
ownership continues to be as prevalent a choice, as that of dispersed ownership. 
As the relative effect of a governance model on corporate performance has not 
been agreed upon among scholars, no one model can get an unqualified 
endorsement or an outright rejection.47
First of all, if diffuse ownership creates problem of agency cost, the logical 
converse of this should be true, i.e., concentrated ownership must reduce this 
cost. The reason for this is simple. Often, “block holders will tend to be efficient 
monitors than dispersed shareholders. To elaborate, controlling shareholders are
42 Cheffins, supra n. 18, p. 24.
43 Ibid; In Ethiopia the recent governance havoc in Bank of Abyssinia is exemplary of 
the problem block holders can cause to management. The bank was reported to have 
lost 75% profit in year 2007/2008 due to dominant shareholders who interfered in 
management’s roles. See Capital Oct. 25 2009 Edition.
44 Annotations to OECD Principles, supra n. 8, p. 42.
45 Pistor, supra n. 16, p. 11.
46 La Porta et al, supra n. 6, p. 1132.
47 Cheffins, supra n. 18, p. 27.
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likely to have a financial stake which is large enough to motivate them to keep a 
careful watch on what is going on” around the company.48 The other benefit of 
concentrated ownership is that the presence of large block-holders such as a 
family yields competitive economic advantages stemming from continuity and 
long term orientation. in this respect, the Anglo-American dispersed ownership 
model is criticized for its features of unhealthy orientation towards short term 
profits.49 The “financial institutions which collectively own much of the equity 
in American and British publicly held companies have been identified as the 
primary sources of this bias.”50
2. The Evolution of Ownership and Control in Ethiopian Share 
Companies
The Commercial Code of Ethiopia has been facilitating the formation of share 
companies since its enactment in 1960.51 However, the formation of Share 
Companies was suspended during the Military Regime and was resumed only 
during its final years when it issued a policy of mixed economy and mainly after 
the collapse of the regime in 1991. Most of the companies formed at the 
beginning were private limited companies. For example among the 125 
companies formed from 1991 till the end of 1993, 119 were private limited 
companies and only 6 were share companies.52 Although the rate of company 
formation improved subsequently, it was the number of private limited 
companies that increased at an accelerated rate as opposed to that of share 
companies (See table 1 below). Most of the share companies formed during this 
period often had five or a few more members. it was only since roughly 2005 
that share companies53 started selling shares to the wider public and thereby 
started creating bigger shareholding base.
48 Ibid, p. 19.
49 Ibid, p. 21. It is to be recalled that the capital markets of US and UK were accused of 
being responsible for the current global financial meltdown due to their admitted 
character of motivating greedy short term oriented high risk appetite.
50 Ibid.
51 J.D. Von Pischke (1968), Shares and Share Trading in Addis Ababa, (Addis Ababa, 
College of Business Administration, Hailesillassie I University), p. 4, note 1.
52 Abu Girma (1994), “Problems and Prospects for the Emergence of a Stock Market in 
Ethiopia,” in Getachew Yoseph and Abdul Hamid Bedri Kello (Eds.), The Ethiopian 
Economy: Problems and Prospects of Private Sector Development (Addis Ababa, 
Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference on the Ethiopian Economy), p.217.
53 Companies such as Hibret Bank S.C and Wogagen Bank S.C, Fana School, 
Yetebaberut Beherawi Petroleum, etc were among the precursors of public offerings 
of shares since 1990s E.C.
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Table 1: The number of companies formed in the period 1996-end of July 2001 
E C (i.e. 2003 to 2009 G. C.)
Year in Gregorian Calendar Share Companies Private Limited 
Companies
11 Sept. 2003-10 Sept. 2004 17 604
11 Sept. 2004-10 Sept. 2005 14 2382
11 Sept. 2005-10 Sept. 2006 11 1437
11 Sept. 2006-10 Sept. 2007 30 1097
11 Sept. 2007-10 Sept. 2008 17 1113
11 Sept. 2008-6 August 2009 21 947
Source: The Trade Registry at the Ministry of Trade and Industry
The last two years (i.e., 2008 and 2009) in Ethiopia have seen an unprecedented 
growth in the number of companies under formation through initial public offer 
of shares (IPOs). While this has helped the companies to mobilize large amounts 
of capital from the public, it has also brought about the dispersion of corporate 
ownership among several thousands of shareholders in each of these companies. 
The trend in dispersion is at least partly the result of the design of company 
promoters who not only lower the minimum shareholding threshold to enable 
small income group to buy shares, but also provide the upper limit of share 
subscriptions preventing the emergence of block holders.54
The separation of ownership and control can practically become complete 
where no shareholder has more than a fraction of one percent of the capital. But 
it should also be borne in mind that separation of ownership and control will 
definitely be incomplete even when there are several thousands of holders with a 
fraction of one percent of the capital, if one person has a big block of shares 
enabling him/her to exercise control. On the other hand, a company with just a 
hundred or more shareholders may exhibit a clear separation if the distribution 
of shares is more or less even. (See* in table 2 below) Therefore, separation of 
ownership and control does not necessarily require the existence of thousands of 
shareholders in a given company.
54 Among the fifteen initial public offerings (IPOs), most of which offering more than 
100 million capital reviewed for this article, 11 had 5000 ETB (5 shares) as the 
minimum shareholding; while the maximum allowed in thirteen of the cases was 5 
percent of the total shares offered.
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Table 2: Ownership pattern in some of the non financial companies
Name of Company
C
om
bi
ne
d 
ho
ld
in
gs
 
of
 
hi
gh
es
t 
10
 
ho
ld
er
s 
in
 %
A
ve
ra
ge
 
ho
ld
in
g 
in
 %
C
om
bi
ne
d 
ho
ld
in
gs
 o
f 
D
ir
ec
to
rs
 in
 
% N
o 
of
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
Cheha Business S.C 5.64 0.564 3.954 177*
Ehil Berenda Ehil 
Negadewoch S.C
9.0 0.909 6.363 110*
Papirus school S.C 3.89 0.432 3.03 231
Shola S.C 4.295 0.359 7.51 110
Sky Bus S.C 1.138 0.020 0.399 2793
Yeshera Tera Berhan Limat 
S.C
6.57 0.657 5.921 152*
Crystal Tannery S.C** 6.666 0.083 2.583 630
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry
*All the shareholders in these companies have evenly equal number of shares. 
**Source: interview with the Company’s General Manager, on 7 July 2009.
Table 3: Ownership pattern in some of the banks
Name
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Brehan Int. Bank* undisclosed 0.016 undisclosed 6000 1.4%
Buna Bank** undisclosed 0.008 undisclosed 11,200 0.9 %
Zemen Bank *** 9.37 0.034 1.659 2,878 2%
Awash Int. 
Bank****
undisclosed 0.037 undisclosed 2700 Undis­
closed
Source:*Reporter, 11 Oct, 2009 Edition ;**Addis Fortune, 4 Oct. Edition; 
** *Zemen Bank; *** *http://awash-international-bank.com/Governance%20home.html
The above data shows that there is a movement especially in the financial sector 
and since very recently in other sectors as well from a closely held company 
towards more and more broad based share ownership. At present, there are 
many more companies with IPOs (Initial Public Offerings).
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3. The Causes of Diffuse/Concentrated Models of Governance
Various explanations, which are at times contradictory, are given about the 
emergence of particular models of governance in a given country. A persuasive 
explanation in this regard is made by LLSV, who argue that the particular 
pattern of corporate governance in a given country is determined by the degree 
of protection that its law gives to minority shareholders.55 While, therefore, 
strong minority right protection gives rise to diffuse ownership56, weaker 
protection tends to discourage such pattern of ownership and gives way to 
block-holding.57 Other theories advanced to explain the prevalence of one 
pattern of governance over the other include, trade policy, size of a country’s 
economy, political ideology, etc.58
3.1- Level of Minority Right Protection
The concept of minority shareholder protection is relative and can only be 
explained in relative terms. In order to minimize arbitrary conceptions, 
researchers analyze it on the basis of selected indices. A more systematic 
presentation of the analysis is that of LLSV as reproduced below.59 One thing to 
be noted is that the indices are concerned solely with shareholder rights during 
voting in general meetings because that is how shareholders exercise power in a 
company.60 These indices (on Table 4, below) are also in conformity with the 
OECD Principles on Corporate Governance.61
55 La Porta et al, supra n. 6, pp. 1116, 1145.
56 A corporate ownership can be said diffuse if the shares are owned or held by 
hundreds or thousands of shareholders none of whom own more than a fraction of 
one percent of the company’s capital. Even when one or more shareholders own 
more than one percent an ownership structure will be diffuse, if the percentage of 
capital held is not large enough to enable the holder to control the company.
57 Ibid.
58 Brian R. Cheffins, Comparative Corporate Governance and The Australian 
Experience: A Reform Agenda,
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=268935> p. 30.
59 La Porta et al, supra n. 6, p. 1122.
60 Id., p.1126.
61 Except the one-share one vote standard on which OECD Principles do not take a 
position, (see OECD Principles on Corporate Governance, Supra n 7, p.41) the rest 
are either expressly stated, or fall within the broad languages of the Principles. Part 
II, C.4 provides the right of proxy voting, Part III. A.5 broadly states the importance 
of making exercise of voting rights in general meetings simple. it disapproves 
preconditions to exercise voting rights, which obviously includes conditions such as 
depositing shares during general meetings. The annotations to the Principles state 
cumulative voting, pre-emptive right to purchase newly issued shares, derivative suit 
mechanisms, p. 42.
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Table 4: Minority shareholder protection index
Variable Description
1 Proxy voting by mail allowed Equals one if the law allows shareholders to 
mail their proxy vote to the firm, and zero 
otherwise
2 Shares not blocked before 
meeting
Equals one if the law does not allow firms to 
require that shareholders deposit their shares 
prior to a general shareholders meeting thus 
preventing them from selling those shares for 
a number of days, and zero otherwise.
3 Cumulative voting or 
proportional representation
Equals one if the law allows shareholders to 
cast all their votes for one candidate standing 
for election to the board of directors 
(cumulative voting ) or if the law allows a 
mechanism of proportional representation in 
the board by which minority interests may 
name a proportional number of directors to 
the board, and zero otherwise.
4 one share one vote Equals one if the law requires that ordinary 
shares carry one vote per share, and zero 
otherwise. Equivalently this variable equals 
one when the law prohibits the existence of 
both multiple voting and non-voting ordinary 
shares and does not allow firms to set a 
maximum number of votes per shareholder 
irrespective of the number of shares owned, 
and zero otherwise.
5 oppressed minority 
mechanisms
Equals one if the law grants minority 
shareholders either the judicial venue to 
challenge the decisions of management or of 
the general meeting, or the right to walk out 
of the company by requiring the company to 
purchase their shares when they object to 
certain fundamental changes such as merger, 
asset dispositions and changes in the articles 
of association. The variable equals zero 
otherwise. Minority shareholders are 
shareholders who collectively own 10 percent 
or less of the share capital.
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Countries that score one point for each of these variables obtain five points. 
What the hypothesis shows is that while there is no country whose legal system 
scores zero for all the five variables, those countries following the Common 
Law tradition consistently score the highest.62 Some countries from the French 
Civil Law tradition such as Chile scores 5 points and Norway from 
Scandinavian Civil law 4 points. Otherwise the average for Civil Law traditions 
is 2.33, Scandinavian 3.0, and that of the Common Law is 4.63 Among African 
countries, South Africa scores 5 points and Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe each 
score 3 points and Egypt scores 2 points. With the exception of Egypt all have 
Common Law systems.64
The LLSV study analyses forty-nine developed and developing economies. 
In contrast, Pistor’s analysis is limited to transition economies in Eastern 
Europe. That may explain the slight difference in emphasis between the two sets 
of indices. Pistor’s indices are the following.65
1. The right to proxy voting by mail;
2. Absence of the obligation provided by law compelling shareholders 
to deposit their shares prior to shareholders’ meeting;
3. Cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on 
board of directors;
4. Legally recognized right of shareholders to sue directors or to 
challenge the decisions of shareholder meetings in court;
5. The minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder 
to call ordinary general meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent; 
and
6. Shareholders have pre-emptive rights when new shares are issued that 
can be waived only by a shareholder vote.
If we look at the Commercial Code of Ethiopia, two of these rights (under 
number 5 and 6) are provided clearly. Voting by proxy is provided in Articles 
398(1) and 402 but no voting by mail is allowed. Hence the score for that will 
be zero as per the LLSV index. Note that the importance of this right is stressed 
by the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance Part II.C.4. The minimum 
percentage required for shareholders to call general meetings is 10% of the 
capital under Article 391(2). Likewise, the pre-emptive right of shareholders to 
buy newly issued shares in proportion to their shareholding is unequivocally
62 La Porta et al, supra n. 6, pp.1130-1131.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Pistor, supra n. 16, p.5.
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provided under Article 345(4) and 470(1). This too is in compliance with the 
OECD Principles on minority rights as reflected in the Annotations.66
But the most important minority protection provisions seem to be those 
under 2, 3 and 4 of Pistor’s index (that are also partly provided under LLSV 
index 2 & 3) which the Commercial Code fails to provide for. Article 401 of the 
Code specifically requires shares to be deposited during shareholder meetings. 
Hence Ethiopia’s score for index number two in LLSV, will be zero. 
Cumulative voting and minority representation in the board are alternative 
mechanisms of minority right protection. Cumulative voting relates to voting 
during board elections in which the votes of the contending groups will be 
multiplied by the number of board seats and calculated for the contenders’ 
nominees in accordance to the proportion of each group’s summed up votes. 
This essentially avoids a majority-take-all outcome. Annotations to OECD 
Principles Part III.A.2 suggest cumulative voting as a mechanism of minority
right.67
while cumulative voting is one means of ensuring proportional 
representation, the method envisaged under Article 52 surely is not. Article 352 
calls for proportional representation in boards and reads as follows:
Article 352 -Right of a minority
Where there are several groups of shareholders with a different legal status, 
the articles of association shall provide for each group to elect at least one 
representative on the board of directors.
What this article provides is not sufficiently clear. First, what is a legal status? Is 
the law referring to the class of shareholders under Articles 335, 336 and 337? 
in other words, it seems to require a situation where shareholders are divided 
into several groups with each shareholder having some internal bond by which 
to identify with its group and vote in concert. However, this cannot be envisaged 
in share companies with thousands of shareholders. Though the notion will be 
easier to comprehend in a closely held company, it will be less useful in the 
dispersed ownership model. in the absence of a clear provision that can be 
implemented, Ethiopia scores zero for the LLSV (analysis index number 3).
The other important minority protection mechanism the Commercial Code 
fails to set out under Article 365(1)68 is the derivative suit mechanism i.e., the
66 Annotations to OECD Principles, supra n. 8, p.42.
67 Ibid.
68 It appears that the drafter of the provisions (Prof. Escarra) had initially drafted the 
provisions in Article 364-367 with the aim of providing for derivative suit 
mechanisms. This seems evident from his Expose desMotifs in which he states:
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right to initiate suits against directors or third parties on behalf of the company. 
Since directors act on behalf of the company, it becomes difficult to enforce 
claims on behalf of the company if the redress is to be sought from the directors 
themselves.69 On top of that, directors may forgo legitimate claims of the 
company against third parties due to collusion with outside business partners or 
in return for some illicit consideration.70 71 Therefore, where any shareholder 
considers that the company should be taking legal proceedings against directors 
or some third party, but neither the board nor the general meeting does so, the 
right to take action on behalf of the company should pass to individual 
shareholders77 subject to defined conditions in order to prevent abuse of rights. 
The OECD Principles also incorporate this element under Principle number iii. 
A.2. Annotations to these principles emphatically stress the importance of 
derivative suits:
Experience has shown that an important determinant of the degree to which 
shareholder rights are protected is whether effective methods exist to obtain 
redress for grievances at a reasonable cost and without excessive delay. The 
confidence of minority investors is enhanced when the legal system provides 
mechanisms for minority shareholders to bring lawsuits when they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that their rights have been violated.72
Ethiopia again fails on this index. A shareholder’s right to challenge decisions 
of the general meeting (anti-block holder provision in Pistor’s analysis or the 
oppressed minority mechanism in LLSV analysis) is provided under Article 
416(2-5). Article 463 also gives minorities the right to withdraw from the 
company when fundamental changes are made to the Articles of Association, or 
to the company. Thus, Ethiopia scores one point for the index of oppressed 
minority mechanism in the LLSV index number 5. The one share one vote index
“These very important provisions regulate the liability of directors and the procedure 
for enforcing this liability by individual or class action. These articles [...] represent 
a sufficiently simple and precise statement of one of the most complex problems in 
company law, i.e., the action which can be brought by each shareholder in the case 
where the fault of the directors has prejudiced the company’s property as well as his 
own property.” See Peter Winship, (1974), Background Documents of the Ethiopian 
Commercial Code of I960 (Addis Ababa, Faculty of Law, Haile Sellassie I 
University) p.64.
It is more probable that, the original rules Prof. Escarra drafted were later changed 
either by Prof. Jauferet who replaced him upon his sudden death without completing 
the drafting, or by the Codification Commission.
69 Hadden, supra n. 21,p.277.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Annotations to OECD Principles, supra n. 8, p. 41.
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of LLSV index is met in Ethiopia as Articles 347(3) and 407(2) of the 
Commercial Code precisely provide for this right. So here will be one more 
point for Ethiopia.
Generally, the minority protection regime of the Commercial Code meets 
two of the six criteria from Katharina Pistor’s index, and two of the five points 
in the LLSV index. Given that the protections lacking under the Code are the 
most important ones that can minimize minority shareholder exploitation by 
managers and/or block holders, it can be said that the law is inadequate in 
shareholder protection.
But a slight twist can raise the scores to four in these indices. For instance 
the cumulative voting under Article 352 can say what it is supposed to mean 
with a slight revision. So does the question of proxy voting by mail. As to 
derivative suit it appears that the drafter initially set out to provide the 
mechanism clearly and it was somewhat later on that the procedure was 
deleted.73
pistor further elaborates these minority protection indices under four 
headings: voice, exit, anti-manage, and anti-block. Voice rights refer to 
shareholder control of the company through voting rights and shareholder suits, 
and in particular include the rights that minority shareholders are entitled to, 
such as the right “ to call an audit commission, a minimum quorum requirement 
for shareholder meeting to take binding decisions, super- majority requirement 
for adopting decisions that affect the existence of the corporation in its current 
form” and “ the possibility to fire directors and managers at any time without 
cause, and the absence of provisions that mandate employee or state 
representation on the board.”74
The exit index is composed of rules that facilitate shareholders to leave the 
company such as provisions that protect the right to sell shares without prior 
approval by other shareholders or the directors, absence of extensive formal 
requirements for selling one’s shares, and rules that facilitate exit by 
shareholders in case of takeovers and other major transactions that may 
endanger their position in the company.75 Anti-manage index comprises rules 
that aim to protect shareholders against management such as the right to sue 
management, rules against self-dealing, rules that require management to 
abstain from or disclose transactions that compromise their loyalty to the 
company.76 Anti-block rules include provisions that put forth the rights to
73
74
75
76
See supra n. 68.
Pister, supra n. 16, p. 10.
Ibid, p. 11.
Ibid.
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challenge decisions of shareholders meeting with the view to limiting or 
avoiding opportunism by controlling block-holders.77
While these protections are available at varying degrees in different legal 
systems, the better their level is in a system, the higher will be the level of 
minority protection.78 Translated into LLSV hypothesis, the higher will be 
dispersion of ownership and the separation from control. Better protection of 
these rights encourages small investors to buy shares giving rise to higher level 
of dispersion. The theory is simple: A good minority shareholder protecting law 
coupled with a good enforcement system will drive capital into companies, since 
the share buying public will have no reason to fear as the legal system gives it 
protection.
if, on the other hand, minority right protection is poor, it would tend to give 
way to a pattern of concentrated ownership. There are at least two reasons why 
the ownership pattern in such systems will be more concentrated:
First, large or even dominant, shareholders who monitor the managers might 
need to own more capital, citrus paribus, to exercise control rights and thus to 
avoid being expropriated by the managers. This would be especially true when 
there are some legal or economic reasons for large shareholders to own 
significant cash flow rights as well as votes. Second, when they are poorly 
protected, small investors might be willing to buy shares only at such low 
prices that make it unattractive for corporations to issue new shares to the 
public. Such low demand by minority investors for corporate shares would 
indirectly stimulate ownership concentration. With poor investor protection, 
ownership concentration becomes a substitute for legal protection because only 
large shareholders can hope to receive a return on their investment.80
Through time, a regime which offers poor minority protection will attract mostly 
block-holders making concentrated ownership prevail. A minority protective 
regime on the other hand can boost the confidence of investors, and strengthen 
the capital market. Annotations on the OECD Principles on Corporate 
Governance states that “investor confidence that the capital they provide will be 
protected from misuse or misappropriation by corporate managers, board 
members or controlling shareholders is an important factor in capital markets.”81 
And, such confidence means that small investors will be willing to pay a better 
price for shares offered for sale, which in turn lowers the cost of capital for 77 78 79 80 81
77 Ibid.
78 La Porta et al, supra n. 6, p. 1152.
79 Ibid.
80 La Porta et al, supra n. 6, p. 1145.
81 Annotations to OECD Principles, supra n. 8, p. 40.
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firms that sell equity. Moreover, most controlling shareholders will be content to 
unwind their holdings first because the law will largely preclude them from 
exploiting their position; and secondly they will not need to privately monitor 
the managers since the law takes over that task.82 They will rather prefer to 
diversify their portfolio in such a scenario, than concentrate it.
Despite its persuasiveness, the above justification fails to explain the 
historical development of dispersed ownership in the USA and UK from which 
the model was widely copied elsewhere.83 Neither in the USA nor in the UK 
did strong minority shareholder protection precede dispersion of ownership.84 
This is partly explained by the typical characteristics of commercial law 
development that “legislative action seems likely to follow, rather than precede, 
the appearance of securities markets; in substantial part because a self-conscious 
constituency of public investors must first arise before there will be political 
pressure for legislative reform that intrudes upon the market.”85 This does not, 
however, mean that the level of protection of minority shareholders does not 
affect ownership patterns. The empirical evidence compiled by LLSV, over 
forty-nine countries has shown that there is a consistent association between 
diffuse ownership and high level of minority protection on the one hand, and 
poor minority protection and concentrated ownership, on the other.86
There is however one thing that should not be left unsaid about the 
development of diffuse ownership in UK and USA. Minority investors were not 
left at the complete mercy of managers and or controlling shareholders. in both 
countries self regulation by stock exchanges played an important role by 
ensuring corporate disclosure, furnishing strict listing requirements, and 
controlling insider dealing and self dealing by managers and block holders.87 
what this implies is that self regulation by stock exchanges can make up for 
lack or deficiency of the law in protecting minority rights.
3.2- Political Ideology
Assuming that the protection of strong minority equity holders does not cause 
diffuse ownership and its superstructure governance model, it means that other 
causes should account for it. There are various explanations in this line. one
82 Cheffins, supra n. 18, p. 6.
83 Coffee, supra n. 19, pp. 25-44.
84 Cheffins, Corporate Governance: Australian Experience, supra n 58, p. 30.
85 Cheffins, supra n. 18, p. 65; see also Fekadu Petros (2008), Effect of Formalities on 
the Enforcement of Insurance Contracts in Ethiopia, in Ethiopian Journal of Legal 
Education, 1, p.38.
86 La Porta et al, supra n. 6, 1126-1151.
87 Cheffins, Corporate Governance: Australian Experience, supra n. 58, pp. 32-33.
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explanation holds that the pattern of equity ownership correlates with the extent 
to which a country follows a right wing or a left wing political ideology.88 Thus, 
in social democracies, that is, nations with governments that are deeply 
concerned about distributional issues, that favor employees over investors, and 
play a larger role in the economy,89 there will be greater concentration of 
ownership.90 * According to Marc Roe the most ardent proponent of this view, 
this occurs “because as social democracies prefer the interests of other 
constituencies to those of shareholders, they will pressure corporate managers to 
suppress shareholder interests in favor of broader constituencies, and only 
concentrated large shareholders can effectively compel managers to resist these
5,91pressures.
This thesis fails to explain why and how diffuse /concentrated ownership 
emerges. First, no convincing reason exists to show that block-holding will be 
an effective defense from the pressure to cater for non-shareholder interests.92 
Secondly, whereas countries such as England have the exemplary form of 
diffuse ownership they are pure social democracies. On the other hand, East 
Asian Countries have concentrated ownership without being social 
democracies.93
3.3- Economy Size
The other theory advanced to explain why concentration or dispersion arises, 
looks at the size of the economy. in bigger economies, economies of scale will 
necessitate bigger companies the financing of which may give rise to wide 
holding. The assumption is that a few individuals will lack both the ability and 
willingness to hold big blocks in such companies, than in their smaller 
counterparts.94 In contrast, in countries where small companies dominate, which 
will more likely be a smaller economy, concentration of ownership will prevail 
as it will be easier to hold blocks in such companies.95 Even a country’s trade 
policy may have impact on the pattern of governance. For example, “a country 
which offers generous tariff protection for its domestic products will tend to 
have smaller companies than would otherwise be the case”96 The rationale is that 
“the tariff barriers will permit ‘under-sized’ firms to survive when, under open
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
Mark Roe cited in id, pp. 22-23.
Ibid.
Coffee, supra n. 19, p. 71.
Ibid.
Id., p.72.
Id., pp. 72-73.
Cheffins, Corporate Governance: Australian Experience, supra n 58, p. 40.
Ibid .
Id., p. 39.
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market conditions, they would lack the resources and infrastructure required to
• • • ,,97remain competitive
The “economy size” theory also fails to explain how one form prevails over 
the other. Simply, it contradicts with glaring realities. If this explanation is 
correct, why would Germany and Japan, bigger economies than the UK have 
more concentrated ownership? why did far smaller economies have diffuse 
pattern of ownership?97 98 Obviously, the minority right protection explanation 
appears to be backed by more solid evidence. Given that it is more recent and 
explores forty-nine economies makes it more convincing.
Drawing back on Ethiopia, what is triggering the growth of dispersion of 
ownership is not clear. The rise of inflation might have made saving less 
attractive for the public,99 driving investment towards the widely available 
publicly offered shares. However, comprehensive study of shareholder profiles 
needs to be conducted along with the analyses of the volume of savings in banks 
during the recent period IPO boom.100 As such, econometric analyses are 
beyond the scope of this article, and i shall skip this issue.
As far as share companies engaged in banking business are concerned, 
there seems to be a governmental policy against block holding. Article 11 (1) of 
proclamation 592/2008 which regulates banking business, prohibits any person 
other than the FDRE Government from holding more than 5 percent of the 
shares in a bank. Moreover, while Article 2 (11) defines a shareholder who 
owns 2 percent or more of the shares as an influential shareholder, the 
proclamation refers to fitness criteria to be met by such a person under Article 4 
(1). The proclamation also states that a share transfer that will make a person an 
influential shareholder be approved by the National Bank under Article 10 (1). 
Taken together, these provisions seem to show that, the government’s policy is 
towards diffuse ownership in financial companies. it is not however clear 
whether or not there is a clear policy with regard to non financial companies.
97 Id., p. 40.
98 See generally La Porta et al, supra n. 6.
99 In Habesha Cement S.C, for instance more than 40% of the shareholders have 5000 
ETB (5 shares) each which is the minimum allowed holding, whereas 90% of the 
shareholders in Buna Bank (i.e., 10, 350 out of 11,500) own less than 100,000 shares 
each. See Reporter, (Amharic Version) of Oct. 11 Edition. Likewise, in Brehan Bank 
S.C, the size of shareholders owning less than 100,000 is 95% percent, (i.e., 5708 out 
of 6000 shareholders) see, Addis Fortune, Oct.4 Edition.
100 According to Access Capital research, in the year 2009, more than a billion Birr 
share sale was launched by six companies. See, Access Capital SC, (2009), The 
Ethiopia Macroeconomic Handout:, p.25. It is not clear whether or not bank deposits 
dropped by an equivalent amount.
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The most important thing in the context of this article is the implications of 
the minority right protection thesis for Ethiopia which is witnessing an evolution 
in the pattern of corporate ownership. The question is should Ethiopia not 
pursue the policy of encouraging small investors and push the move forward by 
further protecting minority rights? The answer for this has to be affirmative. if 
the country needs to create a middle income segment of its population, and if it 
wants to have big companies that can pool capital from the broader public and 
compete on global level in post wTO accession, encouraging the public to 
invest in share companies is an indispensable policy.
The fact that dispersion of ownership is emerging in Ethiopia without legal 
change should not undermine the importance of such changes. Therefore, the 
urgency of the need to reform the law towards achieving better minority 
protection cannot be over-emphasized. On the other hand, even if it is believed 
that better minority protection has no correlation with diffuse ownership, the 
need for revising the law along the lines of better minority protection will still 
be strong. There is already a broad base of minority shareholders in Ethiopia 
creating a sufficient constituency to justify overhauling the laws and institutions 
of corporate governance to achieve better corporate governance.
4. Ownership Pattern and Corporate Performance
The notion of corporate performance is vague since different tests are needed to 
measure performance. But, in this section we shall adopt the narrow conception 
of the profitability of business. The positive relationship between dispersed 
ownership and liquid stock market is undisputed. Though stock exchanges do 
not play a capital formation function,101 there is a growing body of research 
suggesting that an active securities market is an engine for economic growth.102 
Some scholars suggest that diffuse ownership induces better corporate 
performance since dispersed small shareholders who have a small percentage of 
their personal wealth tied up in the company will let managers undertake 
projects that are worth exploiting. Such a hypothesis is maintained by 
contrasting this possibility to risk-averse block-holders who will tend to 
discourage risk-taking and avoid potentially lucrative business opportunities.103
101 Araya Debessay and Tadewos Haregework (1994), “Towards The Development of 
Capital Market in Ethiopia”, in Getachew Yoseph and Abdul Hamid Bedri Kello 
(Edrs.) The Ethiopian Economy: Problems and Prospects of Private Sector 
Development (Addis Ababa, Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference on the 
Ethiopian Economy), p. 228.
102 Coffee, supra n. 19, p.5.
103 Cheffins, supra n. 18, p. 15
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On top of this, management by qualified professionals (which is more often the 
case in dispersed ownership model companies) gives them some edge.104
However, the relationship between governance patterns and corporate 
success is not indisputably settled as far as empirical observations are 
concerned. while the findings of some studies have been found to be contrary to 
the above assumptions that companies with ownership concentration outperform 
those with diffuse ownership, this was explained by the theory that large 
shareholders are active monitors of managers and as a result bring value to their 
investment.105 Indeed, measuring corporate performance vis-a-vis governance 
style seems to be a difficult exercise. For example, in the 1980’s German and 
Japanese companies scored high performance over their American counterparts, 
and it was at once suggested that America should revisit its corporate 
governance style in light of the German and Japan models. But the idea 
immediately subsided and the argument was reversed because since the 1990s 
US corporations outperformed their German and Japanese counterparts.106
Therefore, the contribution of ownership pattern and governance style to 
performance is not yet conclusively settled. what this implies is that a 
governance model alone is not the determining factor in as far as corporate 
performance is concerned. There can be other factors that influence profitability 
and growth. But corporate governance is not solely about performance. Neither 
is company law. It is also about the creation and maintenance of a fair and 
equitable economic relation among investors. Secondly, as set out in the 
preceding section, the influence that legal rules have in determining the 
prevalent model is clear. Hence performance should not be the sole basis in 
making the choice of rules towards the formulation of one model in preference 
to the other.
Conclusions
The corporate climate in Ethiopia is changing with the emergence of newer 
companies with several thousand shareholders who have no control over the 
company. in such cases, control over the company is left in the hands of a few 
managers who in the worst case scenario may in turn be controlled by block 
holders. To borrow the expression of Berle and Means, the rise in separation of 
ownership and control is giving rise to the “ownership of wealth without 
appreciable control and control of wealth without appreciable ownership.”107
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Carver, supra n. 2, p. 87
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Although such a development is to be encouraged for its overall positive 
economic impact, there is a need to be cautious that shareholders may be 
subjected to exploitation in the hands of corporate managers or block-holders. 
There is therefore, a need to carefully re-design the law with the view to 
protecting shareholder interests and thereby create a conducive environment for 
the flow of capital. This significantly requires appropriate laws and institutions 
which can address the corporate governance problems that can arise under the 
new context of separation between ownership and control.
The tight regulatory environment under Proclamation 592/2008 within 
which financial companies, especially banks operate brings their managers and 
block holders under a strict control of the National Bank. But that does not seem 
to be enough in protecting minority rights. Financial regulation, which is the 
objective of the National Bank, is just one aspect of the governance and does not 
give sufficient solution to the problems minority investors face in these 
companies. A look at Articles 12-17 of the Proclamation reveals that the 
objective of the National Bank is not that of protecting minority shareholders. 
instead, it pays attention to the protection of depositors and the maintenance of a 
sound monetary system. This is evident in light of the various provisions of the 
Proclamation including the ones which give the National Bank power to dismiss 
or suspend the board of directors or take other drastic measures none of which 
are contingent upon the request of shareholders. Therefore, the conclusions and 
recommendations in this article regarding entrenching minority rights hold valid 
for financial companies as well.
Problems related to corporate governance are similar in all countries. That 
is why countries such as Japan, Ecuador and Thailand have hybrid company 
laws108 that benefit from the synthesis of different legal traditions and 
indigenous realities. Ethiopia’s Commercial Code is also hybrid.109 In his 
Expose des Motifs, Professor Escarra explains the selection of best foreign laws 
while he was drafting the Company Law part of the Commercial Code:
[T]he goal to attain is to encourage one day the investment of Ethiopian 
savings in large broad based enterprises [....] This is why, without taking into 
account the so called preference to be given to this or that model in the 
Continental or the Anglo American legal system, I had always in mind the 
interest of Ethiopia and I have selected the solutions which I believe to be the 
best no matter where they come from, on condition that they may be applied 
to Ethiopian conditions.110
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110
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The company law section of the Commercial Code can therefore be easily 
reformed without much problem. There is very little problem of path 
dependence, if any, in this respect. So both the existing systems of minority 
protection can be strengthened and new mechanisms can be introduced.
The most important changes that are needed to address the governance 
problems at the wake of growing separation between ownership and control 
include strengthening the voice and exit rights of shareholders. With regard to 
the voice rights, introduction of a derivative suit mechanism seems to be 
relevant. However, as derivative suits are prone to abuse, sufficient conditions 
should be provided to prevent abusive exercise of the right. Both as a 
mechanism of shareholder empowerment and as a good corporate governance 
practice there should be a better regime of disclosure of corporate information.
Exit rights should be easily available through two mechanisms: One is the 
introduction of the principle of mandatory bid. Secondly, the oppressed minority 
exit right under Article 463 should be strengthened. In order to expedite these 
exit rights there is an urgent need to introduce stock markets. In the absence of 
organized stock markets there can be no meaningful right of exit. indeed, this is 
the most fundamental question that the growth of dispersed ownership in 
Ethiopia is posing. Moreover, there is adequate shareholding constituency in 
Ethiopia to support a viable stock market. it is to be noted that only 6000 
shareholders had created a relatively functional stock market during Emperor 
Haile Selassie’s reign.111 This is almost half of the number of shareholders in 
Buna Bank (see table 3 supra). Moreover, the absence of a stock market at 
present may create share illiquidity. In the long run, the public may therefore, be 
discouraged from buying shares thereby affecting the availability of capital for 
companies.
A related mechanism of assuring exit rights of shareholders in takeover 
situations is what is known as mandatory bid rule introduced in England112 and 
transplanted to many parts of the world including EC and Brazil.113 According 
to this rule, a shareholder who acquires control over a company is obliged to 
buy shares of minorities at the same price he paid for control. This in effect 
means that minority shareholders are not only guaranteed the right to exit the
111 Pischke, supra n. 51.
112 John Armour, Simon Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar, Mathias Siems, Ajit Singh, (2008), 
Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the 
Legal Origin Hypothesis, Law Working Paper, 108/2008, 
<http//ssrn.com/abstract=1094355> p.38.
113 Pedro Testa, (2006), Mandatory Bid Rule in the European Community and in 
Brazil: A Critical View, LL.M Thesis, the London School of Economics and 
Political Science, p.17.
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company when control is transferred from one to the other; they also get a right 
to share from the control premium.114
Other areas such as proxy voting by mail and the requirement of depositing 
shares during board meetings should be liberalized to the extent possible. There 
seems to be no significant contention and problem to introduce these changes. 
The issue of cumulative voting or minority representation in the board may 
however be ineffective in the context of dispersed ownership unless it is 
carefully devised. in such cases, cumulative voting may not be a sufficient 
solution since the problem will not be intra-shareholder struggle. Instead, use of 
external (independent) board members has been found effective in other legal 
systems.115
The ideal model is to divide the board of directors into executive and 
supervisory and then assign independent directors in the supervisory board to 
effectively monitor executive directors. Such supervisory board would be 
distinct from the executive board and may be composed of both shareholders 
and external/non shareholders. in the dispersed ownership model this seems to 
work much better if it is associated with the cumulative voting system.116 In 
order to prevent the influence of managers or block-holders in the selection of 
external directors, cumulative voting should be used to allow minorities to put 
their representatives in the supervisory board. But, it may be less productive to 
use cumulative voting for the election of the executive board members, lest 
decision making in the executive board should begreatly hampered by dissenting 
challenges.117 Today’s business world indeed requires rapid decision making. 
This seems to cater for the needs of efficient business decision-making, and 
meanwhile ensure a fair degree of control for minorities. __________ ■
114 Id, p.18
115 See for instance the practice in Germany and Japan, in Yoshimichi Hiraide (1998), 
The Structure of Company Management and Shareholder Control in Japan, in Barry 
A.K. Rider, et al, (editors), Commercial Law in a Global Context: Some Perspectives 
in Anglo-Japanese Law (Kluwer Law International, London), p. 153.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid, p.158.
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